In determining what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, judges are “guided by the ‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’” Such standards cannot remain static, but must “acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by human justice,” for “a principle to be vital it must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gives it birth.”
—Justice Stevens, U.S. Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court has succinctly summarized the three significant differences between juveniles and adults. “First, children have ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’ leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.” Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. at 471 (2012). “Second, children ‘are more vulnerable … to negative influences and outside pressure, including from their family and peers.’ They have limited ‘control over their own environment’ and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.” Id. “And third, a child’s character is not as ‘well formed as an adult’s,’ His traits are ‘less fixed’ and his actions less likely to be ‘evidence of irretrievable depravity.’” Id. “Deciding that a ‘juvenile offender forever will be a danger to society would require making a judgment that he is incorrigible’—but ‘incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.’” Id. at 472–473.
This basic overall principle—that youthful characteristics render a defendant less culpable—has shaped Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for the last two decades, from Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, Miller v. Alabama, Montgomery v. Louisiana, Jones v. Mississippi, to In re pers. Restraint of Monschke (2021), People v. Parks (2022), Commonwealth v. Mattis (2024), and People v. Taylor (2025).
“NO MEANINGFUL DEVELOPMENTAL DIFFERENCE EXISTS BETWEEN THE BRAIN OF A 17-YEAR-OLD AND THE BRAIN OF AN 18-YEAR-OLD.”
Roper v. Simmons considered juveniles’ lack of maturity and responsibility, their vulnerability to negative influences, and their transitory and developing character when it increased the minimum age for death eligibility from 16 to 18. All three of these factors weigh in favor of offering similar constitutional protections to older offenders, also, because neurological science recognizes no meaningful distinction between 17- and 18-year-olds as a class.
Advancements in scientific research has confirmed what many know well through experience: the brains of emerging adults (18–20) are not fully mature. Specifically, the scientific records made in In re per. Restraint of Monscke, 197 Wn.2d 305 (Wash. 2021), People v. Parks, 510 Mich. 225 (Mich. 2022), Commonwealth v. Mattis, 493 Mass. 216 (Mass. 2024), and People v. Taylor, 2025 Mich. LEXIS 603 (Mich. 2025) strongly supports the contention that emerging adults have the same core neurological characteristics as juveniles have.
Objective, undisputed scientific evidence now shows that as a class, 18–20 year old emerging adults are more similar to juveniles in neurological terms than they are to older adults. As a result, there is now an objective indicia of national consensus against mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of parole for offenders younger than 21.
Five years earlier, the Missouri Supreme Court, in State v. Barnett, 598 s.w.3d 127 (Mo. 2020), said, “Barnett’s policy considerations are better addressed to the legislature, which has the authority to amend section 565.020, if it determines Missouri should adopt the prevailing developments in psychology and brain science to expand the definition of juvenile to include offenders older than 18 years of age.”
THE CONCEPT OF AN “AGE OF MAJORITY” IS INHERENTLY AND NECESSARILY FLEXIBLE
In 1875 the “Age of Majority” was 21 for men and 18 for women. Reisse v. Clarenbach, 61 Mo. 310, 313 (1875). When World War II necessitated lowering the conscription age to 18, state lowered the age of majority, too. 18 to 20 year olds were good for training to kill. They are impulsive, risk-taking, and susceptible to peer pressure. So the state and federal government changed the “age of majority” from 21 to 18 in order to enlist and draft them into the military.
[“An infant in the eyes of law is a person under the age of twenty-one years, and at that period … he or she is said to attain majority…” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 847 (9th ed. 2009)]
The line between childhood was historically 21, not 18.
—U.S. Senate Report No. 90-1501 (1968)
UNCLE SAM WANTS YOU!
MUST BE 21 TO BUY AND CONSUME ALCOHOL
§311.325
MUST BE 21 TO BUY TOBACCO PRODUCTS
2025 H.B. 503
MUST BE 30 TO SERVE AS A STATE SENATOR
§21.070
MUST BE 24 TO SERVE AS A STATE REPRESENTATIVE
§21.080
MUST BE 21 TO BUY, POSSESS, OR CONSUME MARIJUANA. MO. CONST. ART. XV, §2 (voted in by the People of MO)
MUST BE 21 TO SERVE AS A PETIT OR GRAND JUROR
§494.425 (1)
§211.041 permits the Juvenile Division to hold a “child” until the age of 21 unless he or she violates a state law after becoming 18 years of age.
Those under 21 are uniquely predisposed to impulsivity, reckless behavior because their brains have not yet fully developed, specifically the prefrontal cortex, which is responsible for impulse control and judgment, is the last part of the brain to fully mature and continues to develop until a person is in their mid-20’s.
Cora v. Comm’r Pa. State Police, 97 f. 4th 156 (2024)
State legislatures have the authority and prerogative to set and adjust the age of majority as they see fit for the public good…TENTH AMENDMENT
MUST BE 21 TO BUY A HANDGUN
18 U.S.C. § 922 (b)(1)
McCoy v. BATFE, 140 f. 4th 568 (2024)
The rights and interests of infants are under the special protection of courts of equity, whose duty it is to vacate every judgment and decree by which injustice has been done to them. Newland v. Gentry, 57 Ky. 666 (1857)
In 2021, Washington became the first state to extend the constitutional protection against mandatory LWOP sentences to offenders 18, 19, and 20 years old. In re per. Restraint of Monscke, 197 Wn.2d 305 (Wash. 2021)
In 2022, Connecticut’s Board of Pardons and Parole commuted the sentences of 11 offenders who had been under 25 at the time of their crime and served lengthy terms already. The Board’s decision was in direct response to the growing consensus that emerging adults should be afforded a second look.
In late 2023, California passed legislation identifying individuals under 26 as “Youth Offenders,” making them eligible for a youth offender parole hearing for crimes including those that result in life with parole. However, the state does not currently allow for “Youth Offender Status” for offenders sentenced to LWOP for crimes committed when over 18 even though legislation was proposed. Cal. Senate Bill No. 672, the 2025 Youth Rehabilitation and Opportunity Act.
In 2024, in a landmark split ruling, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that it is unconstitutional for judges to sentence anyone under 21 to LWOP. Commonwealth v. Mattis, 493 Mass. 216 (Mass. June 11, 2024)
In 2025, the Michigan Supreme Court held that mandatorily subjecting 19- and 20-year-old defendants convicted of 1st degree murder to LWOP violates the principle of proportionality under Michigan’s constitution and constitutes unconstitutionally cruel punishment. People v. Taylor, 2025 Mich. LEXIS 603 (Mich. 2025)
On June 3, 2025, the Hawaii Legislature prohibited sentencing defendants who were under the age of 21 at the time of the offense to LWOP, finding that: “through a court decision, Massachusetts became the first state to ban life without parole sentences for individuals eighteen years old through twenty years old, considering those in this age group to be ‘emerging adults’. The court extended the bright line age cut-off from eighteen years of age to twenty years of age, in part, due to neuroscience research that supports that brain maturation continues through an individual’s mid-twenties.” Hawaii 33rd Legislature Act 152 House Bill No. 103.
The federal district courts have been reducing LWOP sentences for emerging adults under 18 U.S.C. §3553; United States v. Lara, 658 F.supp.3d 22 (March 1, 2023); United States v. Diaz, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2455736 (N.Y. 2024); United States v. Sepulveda, 762 F.Supp.3d 153 (R.I. 2025); and United States v. Viera-Rivera, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79378 (April 23, 2025)
Currently, there are twenty-two states and the District of Columbia that imposes the highest penalties on a discretionary basis.
ONLY NINE STATES MANDATE LWOP FOR EMERGING ADULTS (18–20) CONVICTED OF 1ST DEGREE MURDER: Colorado (Colo Rev. Stat. §18-1-3-401); Iowa (Iowa Code §902.1); Minnesota (§609.106); Missouri (§565.020); Delaware (Del. Code Ann. tit 11, §4290); West Virginia (W.Va. Code §61-2-2); New Hampshire (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §630:1-a(III)); Pennsylvania (18 Pa. Const. Stat. §1102); and Virginia (§18.2-10(a)).
The United Kingdom has banned LWOP for any offender under 21 at the time of the offense. Sentencing Act 2020, C. 17, §322, sch 21, par. (U.K.)
The Canada Supreme Court unanimously ruled that LWOP sentences are unconstitutional for all offenders, regardless of age. R. v. Bissonnette, 20222 Sec. 23.
There is now a national consensus against imposing mandatory LWOP sentences on emerging adults before providing an individualized sentencing hearing. The remaining nine State Legislatures must repeal and amend their state’s law, and raise the “Age of Majority” back to 21.
MANDATORILY CONDEMNING ME, AND OTHER EMERGING ADULTS, TO DIE IN PRISON, WITHOUT FIRST CONSIDERING THE ATTRIBUTES OF MY YOUTH THAT AS AN EMERGING ADULT I SHARE WITH JUVENILES, NO LONGER COMPORTS WITH THE “EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY THAT MARK THE PROGRESS OF A MATURING SOCIETY.
HOW TO HELP
Thank you for reading my public announcement. I hope you are inspired as I am by the “evolving standards of decency” that is marking the progress of a maturing society over the last five years.
If you believe in my mission, you can help support me by:
• Contact Missouri senators and representatives and express your thoughts
at: www.senate.mo.gov and www.house.mo.gov
• Donate time and/or resources to help with lobbying and pending litigation of Zachary A. Smith v. Kelly Morriss, Case No. 25AC-CC0681, Cole County Circuit, Jefferson City, Missouri 65101. I may be contacted at:
Zachary A. Smith, #521163
securus.tech.net
Zachary Smith, #521163
Digital Mail Center—Missouri DOC
P.O. Box 25678
Tampa, FL 33622-5678
• Spread the word and share this public announcement on social media
All the best,
Z.A. Smith
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